Voting is a very personal activity. Whether and how we vote are deeply imbued with our values, self-image, cultural upbringing, and national identity. So I'm not going to argue that everyone should feel compelled to vote. In fact, I think it's probably not the best use of a few hours of time today for most people.
What I oppose is the virulent argument propounded by many economists and other social scientists contending that it's irrational for anyone to vote. When confronted with counter-arguments, some concede that voting can be rationalized by the "warm glow" citizens get from an essentially useless activity. But the whiff of condescension remains.
I dislike the irrational voting argument for two reasons. First, it represents the co-opting of the term
rationality to denote only the most narrowly self-interested and materialistic thinking. This terminology then allows the easy dismissal of any framework outside of narrow self-interest, e.g. morality or cultural norms, as idiotic and hysterical (i.e. irrational). Second, it represents a dangerous boundary-crossing whereby the positive becomes the normative. This sleight of hand has a long and venerated history within economics, among thinkers so convinced by their own logic that they begin to advocate for it instead of trying harder to understand human behavior.
Without any pretensions to a systematic take-down, here are three reasons why I think the economists are wrong, and why ballot-huggers should come out of hiding and take back the rational vote.
Doing something only if you individually decide a matter of global importance isn’t rationality. It’s megalomania.
I don't know the history behind the irrational voting argument. But I can see why it became viral. Economists enjoy clever arguments that go against conventional wisdom. But cleverness can blind us to larger truths, and the choice of outcome in this argument smacks of cherry-picking.
Whether or not one's individual vote affects the outcome of an election is a rather extreme value metric that exaggerates voting's unimportance. Voting connotes value in many ways that deserve more consideration than simply being lumped into "warm glow." For instance, one person's voting is likely to impact other people's behavior in their social network. The information gathering and civic engagement that go along with voting are likely to spill over into other actions a person takes.
Economists don't apply this extreme metric to all areas of life. They don't think buying an Audi instead of a BMW is irrational, or feel the need to attach a belittling label to such a preference, even though neither choice would change the world. Acts based on personal preference are likely to be deemed rational if they involve material consumption, but irrational if they involve cultural norms or morality. I can't think of a rational basis for this prejudice.
If we were to judge all of our actions by whether they have a large impact on the world, we'd have little reason to do anything. Why would we ever treat a stranger fairly? We'd only impact 1/7 billionth of the world's population. Why not throw trash on the street? We'd only be contributing imperceptably to the aggregate cruft. Of course, some might argue that these and all other areas of social responsibility are irrational too ...
It's not just the outcome that matters, but the process.
Voting has value not just because the "right" candidate wins, but because the outcome is the result of every citizen's engagement in the decision. Thus, looking only at the outcome is the wrong metric to begin with.
Most of what we do has little importance. But it’s important that we do it.
Gandhi said something like that. In other words, I think that the kind of strategic and instrumentalist thinking embodied by the irrational voting argument is a poor basis for a moral life.
Most of life is composed of very small actions that affect very few people - mostly of them only ourselves. But my understanding of the evidence from the social sciences is that humans are not very good at compartmentalizing. The way we behave when no one is looking, and when it doesn't matter, goes a long way toward predicting what we do when it does matter.
In a way, voting is analogous to smoking. One cigarette has little impact on our future health, so an addict could easily argue that it doesn't matter. But one cigarette, as a single step in a consistent series of actions, takes on much more significance. Thus, small actions establish habits and neural circuits that lead us toward either a small and selfish life or a moral and generous one.
For most of us,
nothing we do will ever truly matter, in the grand scheme of things. But for a few of us, a few of the things we do will matter. The rub is, we don't know beforehand who will be important and which of their actions will be important. I believe that those who rise to greatness are usually buttressed by a lifetime of small actions, taken in obscurity.
This is the logic of integrity, a form of rationality, in its own way.